CHAPTER 5

Freud the Modernist

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Psychoanalysis and Modernism

In what sense was Freud a modernist?

First, psychoanalysis takes up cultural works from diverse traditions and turns them into ciphers of personal destiny. Freud's theoretical writings and therapeutic sessions are filled with fairy tales, the humanist canon from *Oedipus Rex* to *Faust*, modern dramas and realist novels, popular fiction and humor. Whatever social origins or purposes animated the works themselves, they became an immense vocabulary and flexible grammar for elaborating the self, its benchmarks of identity, its desires, its aspirations. The modernist interprets freely. Stories and symbols become meaningful if they can illuminate—or are illuminated by—the individual's ongoing, continually revised life story. One's personal life-history grounds cultural receptivity and learning; traditions loop through individual contingencies.

Second, Freud's thought, like that of Nietzsche, Bergson, and Heidegger, stylizes the large-scale, invisible forces at work within society and the uncertain, largely unpredictable trends of historical change, distilling them down to a drama of forces and trends within individual experience. The unsettling recognition that no overarching principle determined the actual patterns of historical change distinguished these modernists' response to modernity from that of their immediate predecessors. They embraced nothing like Hegel's Absolute Spirit or Marx's History. Between the 1870s and the 1920s, various modernist thinkers lost faith in the notion that modern ethical, political, and aesthetic ideals were destined to fuse with scientific, technological, and economic advances and lift humanity into a new life. Perhaps only European Marxists originally inspired by Lenin and the Russian Revolution and American pragmatists bewitched by national prosperity and expansion kept the faith. As Carl E. Schorske first showed, Freud's personal crises of profession, nationality, and class stamped his thought with the habit of

recoding political conflict as intrapsychic conflict.[1] The conflicts that had become unmasterable on the political stage of troubled Austrian liberalism were remounted on the psychic stage. Freud's thought stylizes in the sense that it scans the conflicts within society and transposes them to family life, whose conflicts are in turn transposed from the politics of the family to the individual's intrapsychic representations of the family.

Third, Freud's most concrete invention, psychoanalytic therapy itself, is corollary to significant strands of modernist art and literature. Like other modernists, Freud responded to the double imperative of newness and mastery, that is, expressive newness and expressive mastery. The drive to *make it new* certainly derived much of its force from two of art's sometimes antagonistic, sometimes complementary counterparts: fashion and technology. But the imperative of newness ultimately demanded that artworks measure up as a response to the *unprecedentedness* of modern life itself, its continual transformations and dislocations. A century after *The Interpretation of Dreams* and Freud's first case studies, we easily forget how unprecedented psychoanalytic therapy was. Freud invented an utterly new form of expression: an autobiographical project carried out in an asymmetrical dialogue via an amalgam of free association, dream, and transference continually reworked by constructions, rememberings, and interpretations. A dialectic of fragment and totality, Freudian psychoanalysis promised its initiates a new mode of mastery at the level of individual self-narration.

All three features of Freud's modernism—the interpretive transformation of cultural traditions into ciphers of personal destiny, the intellectual transformation of social crisis into individual drama, and the therapeutic transformation of the self through expressive experiment and mastery—place an ultimate value on the individual, even on individualism. At the same time, they seem to erode the moral and ethical claims that tradition, religion, and community make on the individual. Modernity's morality problem—are there any legitimate, unarbitrary moral values and ethical ideals?—is a question on which Freud, like other modernists, vacillates.

Modernity is variously credited with and blamed for inventing the individual: the rights-bearing individual with the freedom to pursue a chosen course of life, as well as the alienated individual deprived of community and living in the world spiritually homeless, abandoned, exiled (metaphors that gained their weight from the waves of wars and pogroms, housing crises, unemployment, and recessions that afflicted Europe). Sovereign and free or exiled and abandoned—both views seem true. The contradictory impact of

modernity on the individual can best be discerned in modern thought's obsession with the theme of alienation.

Individuals in the modern world experience a three-way estrangement. They do not directly control, and seldom even indirectly influence, the processes of their material existence. They are uprooted from any predictable or permanent place within their social world, increasingly becoming instruments of the impersonal forces regulating social life. They live history neither as divine providence nor as rationally controlled change but rather as the unmasterable flow of time. These were the great themes, respectively, of Marx, Weber, and Heidegger. According to their visions, the modern individual is estranged and uprooted, manipulated and exposed.

Nevertheless, this same individual is heralded as an end in him- or herself in all the humanistic strands of thought that take shape in the modern era. Those strands are themselves rich in contradiction because so much depends on which aspect of personhood gets foregrounded. For classical liberalism, the setting of individuality is the capitalist economy. For the republican tradition, revived in the context of the French Revolution, it is citizenship that bestows dignity and power on the individual. In various educational, aesthetic, and therapeutic trends, it is the individual's self-enrichment that counts, as the civilizing process gives rise to modern secular ideals of soul and mind. Our modern efforts at self-designation pit these archetypes of individuality—beautiful soul, cultivated mind, property owner, citizen—against the archetypes' alienation.

In Freud's own formative historical moment, Austrian liberalism encountered the limits of its extraordinary achievements and the erosion of its values. With the emergence of anti-Semitism in Austrian politics, racial identity began to displace the universalist ideology of Austrian modernization, and the revolt of the working class exposed liberalism's failure to integrate all strata of society into a democratic political order. As Schorske and others have shown, this fin-de-siècle crisis informed the birth of psychoanalysis and certainly gave Freud his critical and cautious attitude toward the achievements and possibilities of modern society. By the same token, Freud's career and therapeutic practice did thrive through the first decades of the twentieth century, blossoming into a movement whose associations, journals, and credentialing procedures firmly established his ideas, gave him a public, and drew patients to him and his followers.

Freud's clients were decidedly middle-class, and frequently wealthy. He occasionally lamented that his movement could not address the mental health of the lower classes, but he never doubted that the theoretical insights

he gained from his clinical practice were universal in their scope. He saw himself treating the mind, not tending to the lifeworld of the bourgeoisie. I have argued elsewhere that Oedipal theory, the cornerstone of Freud's thought, is not, as he believed, a universally valid account of intrapsychic representations. Rather, it is a theoretical stylization of the construction of masculinity and heterosexuality in modern patriarchy. Unlike the patriarchalism that modernization overthrew, modern patriarchy invests power in the individual male insofar as he takes up his expected roles in the bourgeois lifeworld. Men's identity hinged on career, citizenship, and marriage, and it was the promises and pathologies of this threefold role that shaped Freudian theory. Freud made the tacit assumption that a man's ability to synthesize these roles defined the "psychic" norm, an assumption that skewed the psychoanalytic understanding of gender and sexuality.[2]

My focus in this chapter will be on one facet of Freud's modernism: analytic therapy, in particular in the work he did between 1910 and 1920. Oedipal theory was firmly in place. It informed every aspect of his reflections on therapy in the *Papers on Technique* (1911–15) and related writings. Those reflections led him to give a rich account of analytic technique, to ponder the ethical framework and moral import of psychoanalysis, and to wrestle with the most basic questions of sexuality and gender.

Therapy as Expressive Form

Lou Andreas-Salomé put her finger on the ethical core of psychoanalysis when she declared, in a draft she enclosed in a letter to Freud on June 30, 1916, that psychoanalysis "established as the principle of its scientific method the absolute integrity of each individual."[3] I take her to mean that there was to be nothing coercive in psychoanalytic treatment. One ventured into the dialogue of the "talking cure" voluntarily, and the power to heal, to alleviate symptoms and suffering, ultimately rested on the patient's own insight and understanding as much as the analyst's.

This parity between therapist and patient was implicit in many of Freud's assumptions and practices. He followed the same principles in treating severely neurotic patients as he did in his own self-analysis and the training analyses of his students. His work on dreams led him to question any hard-and-fast distinction between the neurotic and the normal mind. As he tells his audience in the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1916–17), "the dreams of neurotics do not differ in any important respect from those of normal people; it is possible, indeed, that they cannot be distinguished from

them at all." He wryly concludes "We must therefore say that the difference between neurosis and health holds only during the day; it is not prolonged into dream-life."[4]

Although therapy aimed to make patient and analyst equals, they began on the uneven terrain where a troubled person was seeking help from an expert. The analyst's consulting room, with its couch and armchair, has become the emblem in popular culture for the patient's need and dependency and the analyst's calm and aloofness. But Freud also saw the analyst-patient relationship from a more material standpoint. Analysis was a business. The analyst's practice was a small enterprise organized according to a professional ethos. Analysts should emulate surgeons, Freud advised, and base their fees on their skills and the value of their time.

Freud himself found intellectual as well as professional independence by hanging a shingle, creating a career that was relatively protected from the anti-Semitism and discrimination he faced from the medical and psychiatric establishment. He maintained a no-nonsense attitude about his livelihood. In "On Beginning the Treatment" (1913), he even recommended that the analyst use the discussion of fees to introduce patients to the proper therapeutic attitude by "treat[ing] money-matters with the same matter-of-fact frankness to which he wishes to educate them in relating to sexual life." He further advised analysts "not to allow large sums of money to accumulate, but to ask for payment at fairly short intervals—monthly perhaps"; not to charge too small a fee; and to "refrain from giving treatment free," including to "colleagues or their families."[5] Unlike the shaman supported by the tribe, the priest by the Church, or the rabbi by the congregation, the Freudian healer survived on cash—payment for services rendered. Secularized healing enlisted the cash nexus to aid in the treatment: "The absence of the regulating effect offered by the payment of a fee to the doctor," Freud warned, "makes itself very painfully felt; the whole relationship is removed from the real world, and the patient is deprived of a strong motive for endeavouring to bring the treatment to an end."[6]

Freud insisted that "psycho-analytic treatment is founded on truthfulness. In this fact lies a great part of its educative effect and its ethical value."[7] He introduced the patient to this ethic through the famous "fundamental rule of psycho-analytic technique," which was to be imparted at the very beginning of treatment, indeed, to be elicited from the patient as a pledge:

> You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the grounds of certain criticisms or objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite unimportant, or nonsensical, so that there is no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must say it precisely *because* you feel an aversion to doing so. . . . Finally, never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it.[8]

The rule had derived from Freud's self-analysis and the interpretation of dreams. Free associations were spontaneous but not random. To follow the fundamental rule the patient needed to adopt an attitude that Freud described by means of a modernist archetype, the train ride: "'So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance, you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside.'"[9]

As an expressive form, the analytic dialogue tapped into streams of thought, from the trivial to the shameful, which would be withheld in ordinary conversation. It differed markedly from other innermost explorations known to European culture. It was neither a reverie, nor a trance (whether induced by hypnosis or hashish), nor an act of contemplation (religious or philosophical), nor a confession (to inquisitor, priest, police, or reading public).

Analysis is an *expressive form* in a double sense. It is the medium in which the patient's inner reality gets expressed, from his or her wishes, feelings, and involuntary memories all the way to a persuasive version of his or her life-history. Second, analysis is an expressive form because its actual shape and the know-how to make use of it are the product of techniques and practices that must be developed and learned by the practitioners (analysts and patients). Like other expressive forms, especially artistic ones, analysis derives its shape from the contradictory materials it assembles. I am here presupposing the insight we owe to the tradition of modern aesthetic theory from Hegel to Adorno that the formative or constructive power of an artwork lies in its capacity to draw contradictory contents, imperatives, and modes of representation into some new form.

The contradictory pull in analysis is between spontaneity and reflection, contingency and causality. Free association has the élan of spontaneity and chance—saying whatever comes into your mind—but the consciousness thus reporting whatever flashes by the window is in turn inevitably surprised by the unconscious linkages between the associations, linkages that have the force simultaneously of contingency and necessity. Life's random happenings turn out to possess psychical causality. The psychoanalytic dialogue, as an expressive form, has to oscillate between these poles until it takes shape as the patient's inner history.

Psychoanalytic technique was forged in the effort to master this rhythmic alternation. Free association made spontaneity the rule of analysis, and this spontaneity also characterized the role of dreams and of transference. Dreaming is involuntary, churning images before the mind's eye at the speed of the landscape outside the railway carriage. Dreams also seemed to contribute to the interpretive work of psychoanalytic therapy, for Freud found that the images that the patient's inner dream machine manufactured at night would pick up on themes from that day's session and give direction to the next day's. In other words, the dreamwork itself melded the spontaneity of dreaming with the purposiveness of interpreting. The resulting form is more a collage than a synthesis, a Cubist rather than a Dutch portrait: "in the course of the treatment one must endeavour to lay hold first of this, then of that, fragment of the symptom's meaning, one after another, until they can all be pieced together."[10]

Transference: Technique or Ethic?

The other spontaneous event in psychoanalytic therapy, besides free association and dreaming, was the transference. In contrast to dreams, however, transference arose not so much as an effort of the unconscious to meet the analysis halfway but rather because of the patient's resistance to the developing interpretations themselves. Unconscious thoughts or desires that might at a given moment advance those interpretations would, instead of being acknowledged, hide themselves in the minute particulars of a passion for, and a wish to be loved by, the analyst.

The *Papers on Technique* contains two essays on transference. The first, "The Dynamics of Transference" (1912), provides the premise behind Freud's understanding of transference: "each individual . . . has acquired a specific method of his own in his conduct of his erotic life—that is, in the preconditions to falling in love which he lays down, in the instincts he satisfies and the aims he sets himself in the course of it. This produces what might be described as a stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly reprinted afresh—in the course of the patient's life," though it can undergo changes "in the face of recent experiences."[11] Freud believed the transference was just such a fresh printing; its "stereotype plates" or "prototypes" were the repressed or inhibited impulses that the analysis threatened to bring to light. The analyst would become the object of passions and "anticipatory ideas" that originally attached to the patient's "father-imago," "brother-imago," "mother-imago," and so on.

The key to the transference's role in therapy, however, was not that it proved a false love, but rather that it "emerge[d] as *the most powerful resistance* to the treatment," marking a stoppage of the patient's free associations. Because the transference was "a compromise" between the contrary demands of the resistance and the "work of investigation," the challenge to the analyst was not to convince the patient of the difference between true love and false, but rather to use the transference as a signpost of resistance and guide to the very interpretive work its appearance momentarily blocked. In the terminology of "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" (1914), the patient wants to repeat the repressed impulse in relation to the analyst, while the analyst wants the patient to work it through in memory: "The doctor ties to compel him to fit these emotional impulses to the nexus of the treatment and of his life-history, to submit them to intellectual consideration and to understand them in light of their psychical value."[12]

The technique of psychoanalytic therapy, the skill or art required of the analyst, hinged for Freud on the "handling" of the transference. From the moment the transference emerged in the analysis, the dialogue began to give shape to—that is, take the shape of—a struggle between repeating and remembering. Rather than letting the work of investigation be undone by the spontaneity of a passion, itself contradictorily formed by impulse and resistance, the analyst had to let the interpretive work be directed by the patient's passions, just as the patient had to be guided into "working-through" the resistance itself.

In the second essay on transference, "Observations on Transference-Love" (1915 [1914]), Freud took up the ethical as well as technical dilemmas of transference. The particular situation he chose to discuss occurred often in psychoanalytic therapy. It "is the case in which a woman patient shows unmistakable indications, or openly declares, that she has fallen in love, as any other mortal woman might, with the doctor who is analyzing her." The essay is written from the viewpoint of an experienced analyst advising his colleagues. It is one male analyst speaking to other male analysts. There were scarcely any women practicing psychoanalysis in 1914, and "the Committee," Freud's inner circle of six loyal disciples after the break with Jung and Adler, were all men. The essay has its share of male-bonding tics, as Freud infantilizes the "class of women . . . who tolerate no surrogates" once they fall in love and refers to them as "children of nature who refuse to accept the psychical in the place of the material, who, in the poet's words, are accessible only 'to the logic of soup, with dumplings for arguments.'" Describing the usual result of trying to treat such women, Freud uses,

whether coyly or unwittingly, the image of an analysis interruptus: "One has to withdraw, unsuccessful."[13]

Freud nevertheless exhibits considerable tact and sensitivity in the essay as a whole, being quite aware that his topic was difficult for his fellow analysts and their patients and potentially explosive for a suspicious, moralistic public. He unqualifiedly makes the case that the analyst must neither return the patient's advances nor repudiate them as illusory, immoral, or irrelevant. The case he builds consistently entwines technical and ethical arguments about how the male analyst should handle transference-love. To get a feel for Freud's style of argument, it's worth quoting the following paragraph in its entirety:

> It is, therefore, just as disastrous for the analysis if the patient's craving for love is gratified as if it is suppressed. The course the analyst must pursue is neither of these; it is one for which there is no model in real life. He must take care not to steer away from transference-love, or to repulse it or to make it distasteful to the patient; but he must just as resolutely withhold any response to it. He must keep firm hold of the transference-love, but treat it as something unreal, as a situation which has to be gone through in the treatment and traced back to its unconscious origins and which must assist in bringing all that is most deeply hidden in the patient's erotic life into her consciousness and therefore under her control. The more plainly the analyst lets it be seen that he is proof against every temptation, the more readily will he be able to extract from the situation its analytic content. The patient, whose sexual repression is of course not yet removed but merely pushed into the background, will then feel safe enough to allow her preconditions for loving, all the phantasies springing from her sexual desires, all the detailed characteristics of her state of being in love, to come to light; and from these she will herself open the way to the infantile roots of her love.[14]

What is the significance of this mixing of technical and ethical arguments? It could be the way a wily scientist, steeped in the ethos of the fact-value distinction and acutely aware of the public's antagonism to objective discussions of sexuality, keeps his entire argument firmly grounded in the factual conditions of illness and treatment while coincidentally—luckily—satisfying the public's mind on the ethical question. If so, fact finesses value in Freud's rhetoric. Alternatively, thinking back to Andreas-Salomé's assertion, Freud's argumentation may suggest that psychoanalytic procedures as a whole, intellectual and therapeutic, scientific and medical, essentially *are* an ethics. There is certainly ample evidence that Freud saw the analyst-patient relation and the very possibility of therapy as determined by truthfulness, care, trust. If so, value suffuses fact. It's not all that easy to distinguish

these two attitudes toward therapy in Freud's writings. It was quite likely a problem he considered philosophical and therefore not all that interesting. Let's come back to it later.

Therapy as Mastery

I have been making the case that Freud the therapist responded to modernism's twin imperative of newness and mastery. He created an unprecedented expressive form in response to the unmasterable changes of modern everyday life, and he made the patient's mastery the aim of this new mode of expression. What was the nature of the mastery that the psychoanalytic dialogue promised and sought? What was the patient to master? Here too the nagging question Freud preferred to finesse will reappear: What is the ethic in psychoanalytic technique?

The promise or goal of psychoanalytic therapy Freud saw as a process of enlightenment. The patient's neurotic symptoms had originally formed because of "an obstinate conflict . . . between a libidinal impulse and sexual repression, between a sensual and an ascetic trend." While it was true that "in neurotics asceticism has the upper hand," the goal of analysis was not to lead the patient toward "'living a full life' sexually." Once again letting moral questions take a back seat to psychological ones, Freud insisted that the aim was merely to put the sensual and the ascetic trends "on the same psychological footing," leaving the patient with "a normal struggle between mental impulses": "To make this possible is, I think, the sole task of our therapy." Moreover, there was no question of serving as a mentor when the time came for the patient to weigh the conflict between libidinal impulses and moral or practical considerations: "there is nothing we would rather bring about than that the patient should make his decisions for himself."[15]

Nevertheless, a key factor in this enlightened independence was the patient's ability to learn from the analyst's "unprejudiced consideration of sexual matters," an attitude that itself casts "a critical eye" on society's "conventional sexual morality," whose normal "proceedings," in Freud's view, "are not based on honesty and do not display wisdom." Freud's was always an attenuated criticism of the bourgeois lifeworld and the norms of the bourgeois household. He did not promote sexual liberation, merely a reduction in the neurotic suffering fostered by his society's hypocrisy and asceticism. So long as patients "decided on their own judgment in favour of some midway position between living a full life and absolute asceticism, we feel our conscience clear whatever their choice." His faith lay in the idea that psy-

choanalytic knowledge would demystify prevailing moralities without overturning the patient's mature, self-regulating morality: "We tell ourselves that anyone who has succeeded in educating himself to truth about himself is permanently defended against the danger of immorality, even though his standard of morality may differ in some respect from that which is customary in society."[16]

From within this framework, then, mastery lay in the taming of instincts and the strengthening of the self that deals with reality. The *taming of instinct* Freud understood in the sense of overcoming an impulse whose power to influence one's behavior, feeling, or thought lay in the mere fact that it was unrecognized, unconscious because repressed. The self's *dealing with reality* he understood in the sense of answering to those practical and moral demands of everyday life that were rationally acceptable. He saw neurosis as a depletion of the psychical energy available for erotic gratification, for sublimated activities of the mind, and even for social change. By hewing to a quantitative explanation of neurosis in terms of the economy of psychical energies, Freud once again finesses the moral or moral-political account of repression. In his own words, "The distinction between nervous health and neurosis is thus reduced to a practical question and is decided by the outcome—by whether the subject is left with a sufficient amount of capacity for enjoyment and of efficiency."[17]

The mastery promised by the new expressive form was secular, utilitarian, and hedonistic—an Apollonian rather than Dionysian hedonism: enjoyment and efficiency. Freud saw therapeutic success in a patient's relatively sober resumption of everyday responsibilities coupled with an ability to weigh the importance of newly recognized impulses relative to the limits of the life he or she had already made. He dismissed the idea that the recognition of long-repressed desires could lead to immoral, antisocial behavior. The objects and circumstances that had occasioned the repressed impulses were themselves long past, and the mature self, however damaged by repression and neurosis, had in the intervening years built up and adapted to its lifeworld. The practical and rationally acceptable moral demands of that lifeworld would assert themselves at the end of therapy.

The Moral of Psychoanalysis

There have of course been many significant reassessments and revisions of Freud's concept of the therapeutic promise of mastery. Left Freudians, beginning with Wilhelm Reich, radicalized Freud's own tendency to take

the incapacity for sexual enjoyment as the benchmark of neurosis and advocated a programmatic attack on repressive society for the sake of liberating sexuality. Herbert Marcuse eventually declared "the obsolescence of the Freudian concept of Man." He argued that industrialized, consumer society's increased capacity to meet human needs had overtaken Victorian asceticism and undermined the material foundations of the severe father figure and the cautious, calculating, self-preserving ego.

More recently, Richard Rorty has inflected the ethic of pleasure seeking with yet another significance. He ignores the political intent of Reich or Marcuse as well as the more recent challenges that feminist and gay thinkers have mounted against prevailing understandings of the boundary between private and public in the social regulation of sexual life and gender relationships. Rorty, instead, credits Freud with giving modern individuals a new self-conception and hence a new approach to private *as opposed to* public morality:

> Freud, in particular, has no contribution to make to social theory. His domain is the portion of morality that cannot be identified with "culture"; it is the private life, the search for a character, the attempt of individuals to be reconciled with themselves (and in the case of some exceptional individuals, to make their lives works of art).
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> . . . Freud, by helping us see ourselves as centerless, as random assemblages of contingent and idiosyncratic needs rather than as more or less adequate exemplifications of a common human essence, opened up new possibilities for the aesthetic life. He helped us become increasingly ironic, playful, free, and inventive in our choices of self-descriptions. . . . It has helped us think of moral reflection and sophistication as a matter of self-creation rather than self-knowledge.[18]

Rorty readily admits that his playful ironist is nothing like the moral character-type projected by the stoical Freud's writings. Rorty simply gleans from some unspecified selection of Freud's concepts the idea of selfhood that happens to suit his own philosophical project and cultural outlook. It would no doubt be rather pedantic to object to such a free interpretation were it not for the fact that in the process Rorty lets the therapeutic origins of Freud's thought drop from view. He sheds no light on, draws no insight from, the ability of society to produce or intensify the debilitations and agonies that Freud's patients suffered. Ignoring the social mainspring of psychoanalysis, he can assert that Freud "has no contribution to make to social theory." In Rorty's fable, we postmoderns have somehow just opted for ludic joy and irony. Were that the case, there would likely be nothing to discover about the human mind and moral reflection, private or public, from any psychoanalytic or psychiatric project.

Another permutation on Freud is found in the work of Jacques Lacan. Couching his theoretical project as a "return to Freud," and organizing his seminars and writings as oblique, allusive commentaries on Freud, Lacan reworked the classical psychoanalytic vocabulary into the idiom of postwar philosophy and structuralism. He offers a very different view of the therapeutic process from Freud's, even though his clinical reference points are Freud's case histories more often than his own. According to Lacan, therapy neither tames the instincts nor strengthens the self. It first and foremost displaces the self. The patient's initial discourse—the explanation of his or her troubles to the analyst and the spontaneous narrative of his or her life—is, Lacan argues, the *parole vide*, the empty speaking, the vacant speech, the vacuous talk, of a self guarding its image, making its appeal to the analyst by making itself appealing. The free associations and dreams that ensue interrupt this *parole vide*. The analytic dialogue creates the conditions for the unconscious to puncture the patient's self-presentation. Lacan calls the unconscious the discourse of the other to stress its power to exceed the self's strategies and habits. It is not the discourse of another, since the unconscious thoughts and imagery are your own; yet it comes to you—in dreams, slips, free associations—as though from elsewhere, as though from another. As you accept these encrypted impulses as your own, you are displaced from, have to let go of, the self-regarding discourse through which you normally present yourself to others and to yourself.

The early Lacan called the ultimate self-narrative that the subject achieved through analysis a *parole pleine*—a full or fulfilled speaking—in which the hitherto unconscious elements were fully articulated in the patient's narrated life-history. Lacan backed off this phrase in the mid-1960s in the atmosphere of the radical criticism of the very idea of meaning-filled speech carried out by Althusser, Derrida, and Foucault. After his lectures went public in 1964 and as his audience became predominantly university students rather than analysts, he gave a less utopian, increasingly ironic account of the outcome of therapy. The discovery that your desire and identity are the effect of the unconscious (structured like a language) yields a heightened awareness of chance in the formation of your personality, of the errancy of desire, its whimsy and cruelty. A bit like Rorty's aesthete, you acquire an ironic awareness that your desire is capricious and your identity aleatory.

Like Freud, Lacan saw analysis leaving the patient with a question to answer without the analyst's mentoring or monitoring: Now that I know what I desire, what do I want? *Do I want what I desire?* Unlike Freud, Lacan

construes *jouissance* (enjoyment) as ineluctably transgressive. If you want to "come" (*jouir*), you must submit to errant desire, you must cross a barrier, exceed a limit, defy a law, in your "enjoyment of" another (*jouir de*: to enjoy, get pleasure from, enjoy the use of). Whereas Freud saw treatment terminate with your difficult but lucid readjustment to the less-than-gratifying routines of the bourgeois lifeworld, Lacan expected you, newly decentered and invigorated, to scan your desires, reconnoiter your boundaries and barriers, assay your chances, in order ultimately to decide which barriers and boundaries to brave for the sake of a desire.

It's difficult to avoid a strictly ad hominem assessment of the Lacanian versus the Freudian prognosis. The Parisian ladies' man (to borrow Jane Gallop's definitive ad hominem formulation, though she used it to take aim at the ladies, the women who embraced Lacanian theory, more than the theory) versus the Viennese paterfamilias, cannily amoral but unwilling to overturn a life of respectability, so mindful of respectability, in fact, that he chose sexual abstinence, it has been speculated, to control his passion for his wife's sister.

The appeal of ad hominem explanations here actually points to a larger question. These various accounts of the moral import of psychoanalysis all express not merely the theorists' personal penchant but more importantly the specific cultural formation and social movement undergirding their thought. A mosaic of twentieth-century intellectual life emerges in the psychoanalytic reflections on sexuality and social life. Reich covertly drew on the rich sexual subcultures of Berlin in the 1920s and early 1930s, converting the rebellious sexualities we would today call queer into a decidedly male-centered, heterosexual philosophy of the bedroom. Marcuse was a harbinger of the counterculture of the 1960s, articulating a moral imperative for the urge to reject middle-class suburban life on account of its hypocrisy, shallowness, and functionalism. Rorty turns the Marcusian critique of affluence inside out by reaffirming the *private* possibilities afforded by "education, leisure, and money" and erects the miniature utopia of a suburban, professorial aestheticism that echoes more than it challenges the mainstream values of the 1980s and 1990s.

Freud made less radical—and less optimistic—moral claims for psychoanalysis than any of these revisionist commentators, largely because he believed that the actual success of modern individuals in conducting their lives in enlightened independence was extremely limited. Although he presupposed a capacity for enlightenment and independence in the very aims he set for analysis, he was at the same time struck by how thoroughly the

modern promise of individual autonomy was thwarted by the very conditions that created it: "Only very few civilized people are capable of existing without reliance on others or even capable of coming to an independent opinion. You cannot exaggerate the intensity of people's inner lack of resolution and craving for authority. The extraordinary increase in neuroses since the power of religion has waned may give you a measure of it."[19]

The challenge Freud saw in modern life was twofold: to lessen the asceticism of modern "civilized" morality, and to replace the authority of religion with individuals' enlightened independence. The modern individual was compelled to replace the lost authority of tradition and doctrine with moralities dependent on persuasion and personal conviction. However much Freud doubted whether humanity was up to the task, he never wavered from his commitment to the idea that morality was the province of the individual rather than the community and of moral argument and personal conviction rather than authority and obedience. That commitment is visible even in the texts where he shied away from moral questions, for his psychological claims nonetheless tacitly evoked the various secular value frameworks of modern thought. His arguments are by turns utilitarian, hedonistic, libertarian, and universalist, but at every turn moral value enters his discourse as argument rather than authority.

Freud's commitment to a secular, individualistic conception of morality has dissatisfied his critics from the left and the right. The former want psychoanalysis to furnish a vision of social change; the latter want assurances against the anarchy of the drives and the amorality of values like enjoyment and autonomy. Is the purpose of therapy to undo repression or, on the contrary, to tame the instincts? Freud seems to vacillate between the two. But to get beyond the impasse it's necessary to reframe the question. For there is in fact a dimension of moral (or moral-political) reflection missing in psychoanalysis. It concerns the place of moral relations in the *genesis* of psychological complexes and pathologies.

Although Freud, as we will see, considered this question moot in light of Oedipal theory, it nevertheless agitated his discussions of the limits of therapy. Psychoanalysis was caught in a conceptual bind. On the one hand, the supreme value placed on individuality bolstered the critical, therapeutic attitude toward the moral strictures of religion and the sexual hypocrisy of bourgeois society: psychoanalytic therapy thus entrusted the patient with responsibility for his or her own desires, however aberrant, archaic, or asocial. On the other hand, the theoretical concepts that supported this tacit ethic of enlightened autonomy removed the mind or psyche from the web

of social relationships in which individual identity and desire are actually shaped: psychoanalytic therapy thus tended to remove social, political, and moral contexts from its account of psychogenesis. This theoretical gap becomes apparent in two themes Freud considered decisive in limiting the success of therapy: the "negative therapeutic reaction" and the "repudiation of femininity." I will take them up one at a time.

Negative Therapeutic Reaction

Freud frequently demarcated the external limits of psychoanalytic therapy in his writings between 1910 and 1919. Although analysis could successfully treat the "transference neuroses" (anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, obsessive-compulsive disorder), so called because the patient readily formed a transference vis-à-vis the analyst, it proved ineffective with schizophrenia, paranoia, melancholia, and other disorders in which the patient did not form such a transference. He also occasionally referred to another limit that could interrupt even a properly conducted analysis. Some patients exhibited a "negative therapeutic reaction" because their unconscious sense of guilt and need for punishment caused them to evade successful treatment for the very reason that it would stop their suffering. Freud first noted this kind of reaction in "half-recovered" patients who short-circuited their treatment when some mistake or misfortune in their lives suddenly suspended their symptoms because it gratified their need for punishment. "By a foolish choice in marriage they punish themselves; they regard a long organic illness as a punishment by fate and thereafter often cease to keep up their neurosis."[20]

In one of his last published essays, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), Freud took a more systematic look at the internal limits of therapy. He revisited the negative therapeutic reaction, now using the new theoretical perspective he had introduced in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) and *The Ego and the Id* (1923). The "sense of guilt and need for punishment" were now understood as an unconscious conflict or breach between the ego and the superego, a conflict that satisfied the need for punishment and gave evidence of the death drive. Masochism, the negative therapeutic reaction, and the neurotic sense of guilt were all "unmistakable indications of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the instinct of aggression or of destruction according to its aim, and which we trace back to the original death instinct of living matter."[21]

Classical psychoanalysis was faced with a fundamental challenge, since

it had previously assumed that the whole therapeutic dynamic was driven by *eros*: repressed impulses sought gratification; the self wanted to overcome the suffering caused by its symptoms; even resistance took the form of love in the transference. The inner violence of a breach between ego and superego ran counter to all of that. Faced with evidence of "free aggressiveness" within the human psyche, analysts had to realize that "we shall no longer be able to adhere to the belief that mental events are exclusively governed by the desire for pleasure."[22]

Even though the negative therapeutic reaction manifested a moral torment thwarting the individual's very desire for recovery, Freud did not look to the moral relations between self and others to find the origins of the torment. Instead, he stayed with the explanation provided by Oedipal theory. The answer was firmly in place as early as the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* of 1916–17. So essential are "the two wishes—to do away with his father and in place of him to take his mother to wife"—that "even if a man has repressed his evil impulses into the unconscious and would like to tell himself afterwards that he is not responsible for them, he is nevertheless bound to be aware of this responsibility as a sense of guilt whose basis is unknown to him. There can be no doubt that the Oedipus complex may be looked upon as one of the most important sources of the sense of guilt by which neurotics are so often tormented."[23]

Oedipal theory gave moral sentiments a singular origin: "Originally this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, the fear of losing their love; later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men."[24] The true prototype of parental punishment is the threat of castration. When Freud made the claim in *Totem and Taboo* (1913) that "the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex," which itself "constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses,"[25] he sealed the idea that conscience originated in the *fear* of castration as punishment for masturbatory fantasies of incest with the mother or for the wish to kill the father.

The dogmatism of Oedipal theory lies just here. Freud did not entertain the possibility that conscience or a sense of guilt and responsibility could *originate* intersubjectively in one's experience with others (including nonparental fellow beings), for example, in the experience of injuring and being injured, in doing and suffering harm. Nor did he explore the implications of the fact that even the Oedipal fear arises from a *threat* of punishment, not from a punishment—that is, from what Lacan would later identify as the discursive-symbolic order in which the parent-child relation takes place. Nor

did he seek out a more variegated typology of infantile fears and threats that might have included disapproval, abandonment, humiliation, invalidation, shame, mockery, or repudiation. Nor did he ask whether a betrayal of trust in the earliest self-other relations could, by analogy with "primal repression," impair the very formation of the self, fracturing its relation to the world of others. All such questions were moot (or derivative) because of the explanatory scope granted the Oedipus complex as the "nucleus of all neuroses."

However, psychoanalysis had not penetrated all neuroses, only the transference neuroses. Freud's reasoning was based on them alone: No neurotic symptom could form unless sustained by the unconscious. Since the unconscious itself knows no "No" and forms no judgments, it cannot be the seat of any moral sense. Rather, it is the seat of impulses, libidinal or aggressive, and these impulses form a symptom only after coming into conflict with the interests of the ego. Among these ego interests is avoiding punishment. Therefore, conscience is the result of the conflict between the (incestuous or patricidal) impulse and the fear of punishment. In this way Oedipal theory created a perfect fit between the theory of conscience and the theory of neurosis. But weren't the limits of Oedipus at issue once Freud began taking account of phenomena that did not fit the transference neuroses at all?

Occasionally the inadequacy of Oedipal theory did push Freud to give more ample scope to his reflection on moral relations, as in "Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work" (1916). There Freud explored how every patient's style of resistance provided an intensified form of his or her "peculiarities," "attitudes," "traits of character." To illustrate some significant character-types met with in analysis Freud turned not to his own cases but rather to a series of literary characters from Shakespeare and Ibsen (Richard III, Macbeth, Lady Macbeth, and Rebecca in *Rosmersholm*). Without going into Freud's rich, richly troubled readings of the plays, I want simply to stress that all three of the "character-types" he discusses are defined by complexities or paradoxes rooted in their moral experience. There are the *exceptions*, who live as though exempt from everyone else's moral norms because they themselves have been wronged in the past. There are *those wrecked by success*, who show a determination beyond good and evil to achieve what they desire and then, once it is achieved, begin to disintegrate from a guilt that must have antedated the offense they committed with such single-mindedness. And there are the *criminals from a sense of guilt*, whom Freud associates with the Pale Criminal denounced by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, who commit a crime in order to justify a mysterious preexisting "feeling of guilt."

Each of these types exhibits what Freud would later identify as the condition for the negative therapeutic reaction, namely, that inner violence that bespeaks an *unconscious* breach between ego and superego. The essay goes as far as he ever went in suggesting that the source of later pathologies might come from some primal rent in the individual's relation to others. When Lacan offered an intersubjective model in place of Freud's intrapsychic model, he took another step in that direction, especially by stressing the role of trust or good faith in the discursive relation between self and others. But only a few analysts in the Freudian-Lacanian tradition pursue the question on its own terms. Marie Balmary, for example, reassesses Freud's earlier seduction theory of neurosis to show how, not only in formulating the theory but also in repudiating it, he failed to appreciate how a breach of trust in the child's relation to his or her parents could generate symptoms. Maud Manonni, who has produced one of the most detailed and imaginative records of clinical work in the Lacanian tradition, gives fuller attention to disturbances in the moral or intersubjective fabric of the primary relationships that form the child's identity and desire.[26] The negative therapeutic reaction, in sum, had theoretical as well as therapeutic implications for psychoanalysis; it was an unheeded signal to rethink whether the Oedipus complex could truly explain all that it was called upon to explain.

The "Repudiation of Femininity"

Oedipal theory also distorts Freud's interpretation of the other relevant theme of unfinished analyses, the so-called "repudiation of femininity." The final three pages of "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" are a blur of Oedipal logic run amok. Freud discusses "two themes" that "give the analyst an unusual amount of trouble" and that have "an obvious correspondence" to one another though "different forms of expression" in accordance with "the difference between the sexes." Right from the start, the asymmetry he posits between the sexes suggests something other than a correspondence: "The two corresponding themes are, in the female, an *envy for the penis*—a positive striving to possess a male genital—and, in the male, a struggle against his passive or feminine attitude to another male." Creating symmetry where there is none, Freud calls both themes a "repudiation of femininity."[27]

Whenever Freud raises the theme of penis envy he refers to women who cannot, or refuse to, reconcile themselves to what is denied them in life because they are women. Nowhere does he provide clinical material compelling or detailed enough to demonstrate that women typically or inevitably represent their rage or disappointment as an unacceptable lack of penis. That women feel such rage and disappointment, that many find it intolerable, that they might represent what society denies them via their body image, that they might incorporate society's overvaluation of masculinity into their symbolic body image, that a revolt against the status of inferiority can take the form of rage-filled, distorted images of oneself—all of these hypotheses would find much to support them in the literature, memoirs, and, presumably, psychoanalytic sessions of twentieth-century women. But none of it adds up to penis envy. Even though some feminist theorists have embraced the psychoanalytic concept of penis envy or accepted its psychological truth while revising its social meaning, I vote with the more radical skeptics, for it seems to me that the symbolic equation *deficiency = castration* is too crude to account for the ways in which women's social subordination finds subjective expression within their individual body image, identity, and desire. Consider the simple historical and political fact that from before Freud's time until our own feminists have expressed an extraordinary range of attitudes toward women's roles, values, lifestyles, and modes of self-presentation, all the while refusing to reconcile themselves to what is denied them in social life. It is impossible to reduce their repudiations of inequality to a "repudiation of femininity," whatever significance "femininity" may acquire. Freud's tacit *social* interpretation of women's repudiation of inequality as a "repudiation of femininity" lay behind and propped up his *psychological* interpretation of the "repudiation of femininity" as penis envy.

What about the male "repudiation of femininity"? Freud applies this term to a phenomenon—a man's "struggle against his passive or feminine attitude toward another male"—that suggests the power of homophobia to deplete men's relations with one another. Such a phenomenon might have led Freud to dissect the fragility of masculine identity in a society that banned and denigrated homosexuality or to investigate the murky ties between homophobia and misogyny in heterosexual men. But Oedipal theory deflects those inquiries because it presupposes, however covertly at times, that the heterosexual couple and unambiguous gender identity are an inherent *psychical* norm as opposed to a variable social norm with untold psychological consequences.

Although Freud frequently disputed the norms of heterosexuality and gender identity—from his ideas about the bisexual nature of the human psyche to his refusal to pathologize homosexuality—those same norms kept

inserting themselves into his most central theoretical constructs. Telltale signs of his uncertainty are scattered throughout his writings. When he tries to clarify the exact meaning of the "repudiation of femininity" in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," he does not use his own words but cites a passage from Sándor Ferenczi that, in furnishing a definition of the goal of a truly terminated analysis, baldly asserts the most sexist and heterosexist of psychoanalytic assumptions:

> Every male patient must attain a feeling of equality in relation to the physician as a sign that he has overcome his fear of castration; every female patient, if her neurosis is to be regarded as fully disposed of, must have got rid of her masculinity complex and must emotionally accept without a trace of resentment the implications of her female role.[28]

Even as he distances himself from Ferenczi's therapeutic expectations—"speaking from my own experience, I think that in this Ferenczi was asking a very great deal"—Freud incorporates these normative definitions of gender and sexuality into his own discussion, leaving no doubt as to the nature of the female role: "Normally, large portions of [a woman's masculinity] complex are transformed and contribute to the construction of her femininity: the appeased wish for a penis is destined to be converted into a wish for a baby and for a husband, who possesses a penis."[29] A woman's "masculinity complex" has but two possible fates; either penis envy is transformed into the gratifications of marriage and motherhood or it is "retained in the unconscious and, from out of its state of repression, exercises a disturbing influence." Freud considered these vicissitudes of penis envy to be "purely psychological." To maintain that thesis he had to relegate the moral-political question of sexual inequality to the margins, first by reducing the social phenomenon of women's struggles against inequality to the little girl's penis envy and then by reinterpreting the grown woman's dilemmas and choices as the inner drama of her masculinity complex: would her primordial penis envy undergo a pathogenic repression or would it be transformed into the socially acceptable role of passivity, subordination to a man, and satisfaction with motherhood as a substitute for other gratifications in life?[30]

Freud's own account of the force of the "repudiation of femininity" in interrupting the therapy process is as follows:

> At no other point in one's analytic work does one suffer more from an oppressive feeling that all one's repeated efforts have been in vain, and from a suspicion that one has been "preaching to the winds," than when one is trying to persuade a woman to abandon her wish for a penis on the ground of its being unrealizable or when one is seeking to convince a man that a passive attitude toward men does not always signify castration and that it is indispensable in many relationships in life. The rebellious overcompensation of the male produces one of the strongest transference-resistances. He refuses to subject himself to a father-substitute, or to feel indebted to him for anything, and consequently he refuses to accept his recovery from the doctor. No analogous transference can arise from the female's wish for a penis, but it is the source of outbreaks of severe depression in her, owing to an internal conviction that the analysis will be of no use and that nothing can be done to help her. And we can only agree that she is right, when we learn that her strongest motive in coming for treatment was the hope that, after all, she might still obtain a male organ, the lack of which was so painful to her.[31]

The supposed correspondence between the male and female "repudiation of femininity" now issues into a scarcely disguised asymmetry: a man's "passive attitude toward men does not always signify castration" while a woman's aspiration for anything beyond her female role invariably signifies penis envy. From there the asymmetries simply proliferate: women's "severe depression" versus men's "rebellious overcompensation"; women's rage against inferiorization versus men's repudiation of emotional reciprocity; women's resentment over their social role versus men's fragile prestige; women's longing for equality versus men's denial of indebtedness. Thanks to the various waves of feminist theory and practice and the accompanying experiments and changes in everyday life, we discern psychosocial patterns of sexual politics in these oppositions more readily than did Freud.

He disclosed the patterns but eclipsed the moral-political relations that affected his patients' experience of sexuality and gender. Eschewing the moral-political dimension, he made do with a confusing dichotomy between the "psychological" and the "biological":

> We often have the impression that with the wish for a penis and the masculine protest we have penetrated all the psychological strata and have reached the bedrock, and that thus our activities are at an end. This is probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock. The repudiation of femininity can be nothing else than a biological fact, a part of the great riddle of sex.[32]

Contrary to Ferenczi's aspiration to solve the riddle, Freud did not presume that the whole of gender identity is "psychological"; Ferenczi's total gender therapy implied that the patient could adequately uncover his or her inner representations of masculinity and femininity (whatever their origins) and then emotionally accept the "proper" set once the contingent barriers to such acceptance were identified and overcome. In too many cases, accord-

ing to Freud, the individual's inner representations simply did not permit such acceptance. What then was the source of the misfit between the representations and the patient's desire and identity? Freud's theoretical habits led him to consider the source to be "biological," by which he meant either "constitutional" factors (innate peculiarities or inherited tendencies below the level of psychical representations) or the death drive (the unmasterable rhythm and strife of organic life).

I certainly do not want to suggest that there is no biological substratum of psychological life; science continues to explore the whole realm of physiological, chemical, neurological, and genetic determinations of gender and sexuality. I am arguing, rather, that the kinds of misfit that Freud identified in gender and sexuality have a large cultural, social, and moral-political component that lies hidden behind the psychology/biology polarity. Freud reached not so much bedrock as a limit—or hole—at the heart of analysis that touched on the political as well as the biological conditions of gender and sexuality. He recognized that the socialization to heterosexuality and gender role more often than not remained unfinished; that is why he rejected Ferenczi's assumption that heterosexuality and unambiguous gender identity were normatively secured in society and normally achieved in the lives of men and women. Individuals' sexual experience and identity did not obey the dictates of modern patriarchy, and Freud frequently emphasized that the supposedly normal outcome of the Oedipus complex was rare, an exception rather than a norm. The psyche's recalcitrance to patriarchal or Oedipal norms is the unacknowledged theme of "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," but the moral-political questions that press against Freud's reflection are ultimately evaded and their import for psychoanalysis unexplored.

The tracks left by those evasions are what give Freud's texts their unique power as a drama of the mind grappling with the mind. To reiterate, the tracks I have tried to follow here are: Freud's suggestive equivocations when it came to distinguishing the technique and the ethic of transference; his undeveloped hints, drawn from literature, of a primal rent in the moral relations to others; and the stubborn return of modern patriarchal and heterosexual norms in a thinker who distrusted all norms.

Freud the therapist was modernist in his impulse to separate the analytic dialogue from morality. The personal transformation that therapy offered had nothing to do with acquiring a code of conduct or embracing particular values. Freud thereby kept religion at an arm's length and conveyed to

his patients a deeply secular morality, which called upon them to follow their individual moral convictions in making ultimate choices. At the same time, he did not embrace Kant's conception of moral autonomy, which provided the modern age with its surest alternative to religious and communal sources of the moral self. Instead, he demystified the indwelling autonomy of Kantian individuality by exposing the impulses and rages that traverse the ego. As Lacan argued in his great essay "Kant avec Sade," psychoanalysis sees a violence, even a delight in torment, at the very heart of the self-regulating self's conscience.[33] In sum, Freud rejected the comforts of the cradling, coercive community of religious morality *and* the transcendental certainties of universalistic individual morality. In that sense, he unflinchingly affirmed that moral experience is ungrounded in its origins and uncertain in its outcomes.

Freudian therapy also kept moral-political reflection at bay, in part with the aim of not influencing or contesting the patient's personal convictions and beliefs. But what comes to light in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" is that Freud and other analysts brought to therapy their society's moral-political determinations of the meaning of gender identity and sexual orientation and in turn failed to investigate those determinations in their own theories of gender and sexuality. What remained crucially unaddressed was not so much the origins of our moral capacity as the consequences of the ruptures in our moral and moral-political relations with each other. By moral-political rupture I mean the violence or exploitation woven into modern institutions. Gender identity cannot be understood without reference to women's subordination and inequality; sexual orientation cannot be made intelligible without reference to the severe moral and legal barriers imposed on homosexuality. Freud left a crucial gap in his psychoanalytic reflection on modernity because he could not overcome the heterosexism of his own theory when it came to the riddle of gender and sexuality or unveil the workings of homophobia in modern life, including in psychoanalysts' own procedures and concepts.

Let us not, however, congratulate ourselves for surpassing Freud. The theoretical obstacles he encountered are not that easy to overcome. Psychoanalysis rests on the seam between an aesthetic-psychological and a moral-political attitude toward sexuality. The two attitudes are simultaneous and yet incommensurate. They are not amenable to theoretical synthesis. The moral-political dimension of sexuality and gender, no matter how critical and progressive the elucidation of it, will never disclose all that determines sexuality and gender in psychic life. The critique of modern patriarchy and

homophobia in the social construction of sexuality and gender reaches only so far; it can overturn the assumption that Oedipal norms legitimately guide the aim of analysis, and it can bring to light the role of homophobia and misogyny in psychosexual life, but it cannot explain the psyche by means of anti-norms or alternative norms any more than Ferenczi could explain it by the prevailing norms. Moral-political reflection is a crucial and, I have argued, largely missing element of psychoanalytic theory. Nevertheless, when it comes to psychoanalytic practice, Freud was right to separate therapy from morality. The analytic space—starting with the consulting room, the couch, and the armchair—is a realm of radically individual freedom. In this space one is free to unfold one's life-history in a dialogue untouched by the demands of the state, society, community, or family, even as the very possibility of such a material and psychic space, and of such a freedom, is created by modern social and political institutions. The lapses in Freud's theory, and perhaps in his practice, occurred when he did not see how the covert power of social and political institutions like sexual inequality or the proscription of homosexuality returned *within* the analytic space. Those flaws in his social thought are most significant, however, because they compromised the hallmark of his therapeutic ethic: the absolute integrity and radical freedom of each individual.

Shock Effects: Marinetti, Pathology, and Italian Avant-Garde Poetics

LAWRENCE RAINEY

The "Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature" (published in May 1912) begins with a narrative vignette that precedes the manifesto proper, depicting the speaker as he sits astride the fuel tank of a biplane that is soaring over the city of Milan.[1] As he glances at the urban panorama below, the speaker announces his ambition to destroy "the Latin period," a type of sentence he goes on to characterize with metaphors of the body that playfully allude to ancient rhetorical terminology, in which the periodic sentence had been said to be composed of "members."[2] The classical period has "a head, a stomach, two legs and two flat feet, but," he adds proleptically, "it will never have two wings" (*LMM*, 92; *TIF*, 46). No sooner has this been said, however, than the speaker's discourse abruptly changes direction: he disavows his own authority, ascribes his statements to another source, and then enigmatically vanishes altogether: "This is what the swirling propeller told me as I sped along at two hundred meters above the smokestacks of Milan. And the propeller added . . ." (*LMM*, 92; *TIF*, 46). The ellipsis gives way to the manifesto proper, with its formulaic listing of instructions and interdictions, a text that has been the subject of many discussions assessing its form, contents, and historical precedents.[3] Though such studies have enhanced our sense of the manifesto's interplay of argument and rhetorical form, their neglect of the opening vignette has deflected attention from a complex of metaphors that not only inform the opening sketch of "The Technical Manifesto," but also recur throughout Marinetti's early manifestos and link together a series of motifs central to the Futurist project. Encompassing images of mediums and automatic writing, analogies between the body and language, and a metaphorics of shock, trauma, and pathology, this complex of metaphors owes much to debate among psychologists and psychiatrists in the decades prior to the creation of Futurism, and as assimilated and mobilized by Marinetti, it poses a series of anxious questions about identity and

54. Ibid., 180

55. Weschler, *Human Comedy*, 168.

56. See Braun, *Picturing Time*, 182–83. For Marey's attitude toward the *cinématographe* and projected motion pictures generally, see ibid., 195–96, and Wechsler, *Human Comedy*, 144. I discuss his lack of enthusiasm more extensively in "'Animated Pictures'" 476–79.

57. See Braun, *Picturing Time*, 182–86. Demenÿ's work as a chronophotographer and his apparatuses and business deals have been detailed by the exemplary scholar Laurent Mannoni in "Glissements progressifs vers la plaisir: remarques sur l'oeuvre chronographique de Marey et Demenÿ," *1895* 18 (Summer 1895): 11–52. Mannoni proposes the audacious and fascinating theory that Demenÿ's negotiation with the Lumières may have culminated in the theft of certain of his technical ideas by the Lumières for the perfection of the *cinématographe* ("Glissements progressifs," 35).

58. Mannoni, "Glissements progressifs," 41. In his major work on early cinema, *Le grand art de la lumière et de l'ombre: archéologie du cinéma* (Paris: Nathan Université, 1994), 311, Mannoni reveals that Georges Demenÿ's brother, Paul Demenÿ, was the friend of Arthur Rimbaud and the person to whom the famous "Lettre au voyant" was addressed in 1871.

59. *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: New American Library, 1963), 246.

60. Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), esp. 229–596.

61. See Bernard and Gunthert, *L'Instant rêvé*, 114.

62. Neil Harris, *Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 57.

63. On the relation between the tradition of *curiositas* and the early film style that I term "the cinema of attractions," see my essay "An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Cinema and the (In)Credulous Spectator," in *Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film*, ed. Linda Williams (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 114–33.

64. Rachel Low, *The History of the British Film*, vol. 1, *1896–1906* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), 76.

65. *The Chap Book*, June 15, 1896, quoted in Terry Ramsaye, *A Million and One Nights: A History of the Motion Picture* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926), 259.

66. André de Lorde and Alfred Binet, *Une leçon à la Salpêtrière*, in André de Lorde, *Théâtre d'épouvante* (Paris: Charpentier et Fasquelle, 1909), 1–81. Binet is the famous neurologist who also recounts Lorde's anecdote about photographing Blanche Witmann cited above in this chapter.

67. Rae Beth Gordon, "Le Caf' conc' et l'hystérie," *Romantisme* 64 (Jan.–Mar. 1989): 53–66.

68. That the performer dressed as a woman in *Goo Goo Eyes* has sometimes been identified as a man only increases our sense of the carnivalesque in these films, the ambiguous physiognomy of gender found in both popular entertainment and hysteria.

69. On these utopian dimensions in Benjamin, see Susan Buck-Morss, "Mythic Nature: Wish Image," in her *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 110–58.

70. Roland Barthes, "The Face of Garbo," in his *Mythologies*, ed. and trans. Annette Laver (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 56–57.

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1. Carl E. Schorske, "Politics and Patricide in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*," in *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1981), 181–207.

2. See my *Straight Male Modern: A Cultural Critique of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

3. Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé, *Letters*, ed. Ernst Pfeiffer, trans. William and Elaine Robson-Scott (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 47.

4. Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III)* (1916–17), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), 16: 456–57. Hereafter referred to as S.E.

5. Freud, "On the Beginning of Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis I)" (1913), S.E. 12: 131–32.

6. Ibid., 132.

7. Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis III)" (1915 [1914]), S.E. 12: 164.

8. Freud, "On the Beginning of Treatment," 134–35.

9. Ibid., 135.

10. Freud, "The Handling of the Dream-Interpretation in Psycho-Analysis" (1911), S.E. 12: 93.

11. Freud, "The Dynamics of Transference" (1912), S.E. 12: 99–100.

12. Ibid., 101, 103, 108. See also "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II)" (1914), S.E. 12: 147–56.

13. Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis III)" (1915 [1914]), S.E. 12: 159, 166–67.

14. Ibid., 166.

15. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III)*, 432–33.

16. Ibid., 434.

17. Ibid., 457.

18. Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection," *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 154, 155.

19. Freud, "The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy" (1910), S.E. 11: 146.

20. Freud, "Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy" (1919 [1918]), S.E. 17: 163.

21. Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), S.E. 23: 243.

22. Ibid., 244, 243.

23. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III)*, 331–32.

24. Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), S.E. 14: 102.

25. Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (1913 [1912–13]), S.E. 13: 156–57.

26. Marie Balmary, *Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis: Freud and the Hidden Fault of the Father*, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Maud Manonni, *The Backward Child and His Mother: A Psychoanalytic Study*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972). I have commented on Balmary and Manonni in *Straight Male Modern*, 91–95, 204–22. See also my "Introduction" to Maud Manonni, *Separation and Creativity: Refinding the Lost Language of Childhood*, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 1999), xvii–xxxi.

27. Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," 250.

28. Ibid., 251 n., citing Sándor Ferenczi, "The Problem of the Termination of Analysis."

29. Ibid., 251.

30. My argument here should not be taken as a wholesale criticism of Freud's concept of the castration complex. I am concerned with how he articulated (and disarticulated) castration and the social-political categories of gender and sexuality, especially in the theme of penis envy. Far-reaching reexaminations of the Oedipus complex, castration, and femininity have recently been undertaken by analysts in the Lacanian tradition. See, for example, Paul Verhaeghe, *Does the Woman Exist? From Freud's Hysteric to Lacan's Feminine*, trans. Marc du Ry (New York: Other Press, 1999), esp. 205–40. From a clinical as well as theoretical perspective, Verhaeghe reworks the whole of Freud's reflections on castration in order to show that when he interpreted the opposition between having-a-penis and not-having-a-penis as the fixed insignia of sexual difference he mistook a fantasy for reality. Castration enters psychic life as a multivalent fantasy: 1) "The idea of castration, as it arises in the infant's world, is first of all an *interpretation* of the female genitals, one that makes them disappear in such a way that they are never seen. The castration complex covers the mystery of femininity." 2) In the ordeal of separation, that is, in the child's crooked path toward pursuing its own desires and sensing its own autonomy, this idea of castration becomes a kind of defensive protection or bar against dependence on maternal omnipotence, against being swept up in, in Lacanian terminology, the enjoyment (*jouissance*) of the Other. 3) The *threat* of castration—which Freud's Oedipal theory made the origin and benchmark of the castration complex—is also a fantasy, indeed a derivative of the previous ones, which shifts the primordial anxiety

of being devoured in the maternal Other's enjoyment over onto a new, more "workable" anxiety in the face of the paternal Other's threatening "No"—more workable because its prohibitions also signify, and point the way to, unforeseen permitted pleasures. In Verhaeghe's account, castration is not, as in Freud's Oedipal theory or Ferenczi's gender therapy, a blueprint for the assumption of socially acceptable roles but rather the inner labyrinth of multilayered fantasy through which the individual is fated to seek his or her autonomy and desire.

31. Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," 252.

32. Ibid.

33. Jacques Lacan, "Kant avec Sade," in *Écrits* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 765–90.

6. RAINEY: SHOCK EFFECTS

1. F. T. Marinetti, "The Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature," in *Let's Murder the Moonshine: Selected Writings/F. T. Marinetti*, ed. and trans. R. W. Flint (Los Angeles: Sun and Moon Press, 1991; 1st ed., New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1971), 92. Hereafter all references to the 1991 edition are given in the text with the abbreviation *LMM*. Whenever appropriate, I have altered the English translations in order to correct mistakes or underscore connotations pertinent to my discussion. The references to the edition by R. W. Flint are meant to help readers check the only available translation into English. For the text in Italian, see Luciano de Maria, ed., *Teoria e invenzione futurista*, 2d ed. (Milan: Mondadori, 1990), 46. Hereafter this edition is abbreviated *TIF*, and page reference are given in parentheses within the text.

2. For discussion of this terminology, see Josef Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1974), 317–19, with references to the ancient sources.

3. See, for example, Filippo Bettini, "Forma e contenuto nel 'Manifesto Tecnico,'" paper presented at the conference "Parole in Libertà Futuriste: Futurist Literature," University of California at Los Angeles, Mar. 12, 1993. See also Marjorie Perloff, *The Futurist Moment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 56–61. One discussion that focuses on the opening scene is the excellent essay by Jeffrey Schnapp, "Propeller Talk," *Modernism/Modernity* 1, no. 13 (Sept. 1994): 154–76.

4. See William Butler Yeats, "Preliminary Examination of the Script of E. R. [Elizabeth Radcliffe]," in *Yeats and the Occult*, ed. George Mills Harper (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975), 130–71. For Yeats's subsequent involvement with automatic writing, see George Mills Harper, ed., *Yeats's Notes for "A Vision"* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 1: 1–55.

5. On Breton and Soupault, see Marguerite Bonnet's "Notice" in André Breton, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Marguerite Bonnet (Paris: Éditions du Pléiade, 1986), 1: 1121–48.

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